Case Comments   S. Sovereign Immunity
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. V. United States by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 30
Winter 1-1-1993
Case Comments S. Sovereign Immunity Goldstar
(Panama) S.A. V. United States
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comments S. Sovereign Immunity Goldstar (Panama) S.A. V. United States, 50 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 397 (1993), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol50/iss1/30
CASE COMMENTS
holding that Howard's general statements made on the golf course amounted
to only puffery is consistent with other federal decisions.
65
S. SOVEREiGN IImAmrry
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States
967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992)
The United States is not subject to suit unless it explicitly waives its
sovereign immunity.6 6 One explicit waiver of immunity is the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). The statute provides that the district courts have
exclusive jurisdiction for civil actions resulting from the negligent or wrong-
ful conduct of federal government employees acting within the scope of
their employment.65  However, Congress limited the scope of this waiver
with certain enumerated exceptions. 658 As a result, subject matter jurisdiction
in actions against the United States is quite limited. Recently, the Fourth
Circuit had the opportunity to broaden jurisdiction in Goldstar (Panama)
S.A. v. United States.6 9
In December 1989, United States forces invaded Panama and occupied
the capital, Panama City. The plaintiffs (Goldstar) owned businesses in the
occupied city. The United States forces remained in the city for nearly a
month and effectively eliminated the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF),
Panama's only police force. The United States, knowing the PDF's role,
tried to provide protection and police Panama City. However, plaintiffs
contend that the United States negligently failed to provide adequate per-
sonnel, equipment, and orders to protect civilians and businesses within the
city. This failure, Goldstar argued, allowed uncontrolled mobs to loot its
businesses.
The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia seeking damages for the destruction of their
property. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Goldstar appealed, arguing that jurisdiction was proper because
the United States waived its sovereign immunity. Goldstar advanced two
theories supporting its contention. The Fourth Circuit addressed each theory
separately.
655. See Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that broker's description
of stock as "marvelous" was not factual misrepresentation actionable under securities law);
Newman v. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "[c]ourts have
recognized a category of statements by brokers which are better characterized as 'puffery' than
as material misstatements ... land] the reasonable investor is presumed to understand that this
is nothing more than the 'common puff of a salesman,' not a material factual misstatement.").
656. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (holding that United States
cannot be sued without waiver of sovereign immunity).
657. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(h) (1988).
658. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
659. 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).
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First, Goldstar argued that certain provisions of the Hague Convention,
an international treaty to which the United States is a party, constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity. The treaty provides that a party who violates
certain regulations shall in some cases be liable to pay compensation for
resulting damages. Goldstar claimed that the United States violated a Hague
Convention regulation by failing as an occupying force, to take necessary
measures to restore order. The plaintiffs contended that this provision
constituted a self-executing waiver of sovereign immunity, and therefore,
the United States was liable for compensation.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention. First, the court stated that
international treaties are not presumed to create privately enforceable rights,
but rather are self-executing only if the document as a whole manifests an
intent to provide a private right of action. The Fourth Circuit examined
the entire document and found no explicit provision creating a private right
of action. The court further determined that a reasonable reading of the
treaty revealed no intent by the signatories to create such a right.
The Fourth Circuit compared the provisions of the Hague Convention
with similar provisions of the Geneva Convention. The court reasoned that
the comparison was appropriate because the Supreme Court had recently
concluded that the Geneva Convention did not create a private cause of
action. The Fourth Circuit determined that the language of the two provi-
sions were largely similar, and therefore, the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention need not be construed to have different meanings. The
comparison yielded the conclusion that the Hague Convention did not create
a private cause of action.
Finally, the court examined the language in the treaty stating that parties
would issue instructions to their own armed forces. The court concluded
that such a provision is evidence that each individual nation would take
subsequent executory actions to discharge the obligations of the treaty.
Therefore, the court concluded that the treaty is not self-executing and does
not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Goldstar alternatively argued that jurisdiction was proper under the
FTCA. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the FTCA explicitly grants
jurisdiction and waives sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United
States, but the court also noted that Congress placed limits on the statute's
scope. First, the court explained, the FTCA does not create novel causes
of action."0 The FTCA only conveys jurisdiction when an alleged breach
of duty is tortious under state law or a federal law analogous to a state
law. The court rejected Goldstar's argument that the Hague Convention
provided for a cause of action, and that as an international treaty, it was
equivalent to federal law because the Hague Convention was not self-
executing, and therefore, it did not create a cause of action. Therefore, no
tortious cause of action existed under federal law. Finding no valid tort for
660. Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1992).
